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The Sharing Economy and the  
Edges of Contract Law:  
Comparing U.S. and U.K. Approaches 
Miriam A. Cherry* 
Technology and the rise of the on-demand or sharing economy have created 
new and diverse structures for how businesses operate and how work is conducted. 
Some of these matters are intermediated by contract, but in other situations, 
contract law may be unhelpful. For example, contract law does little to resolve 
worker classification problems on new platforms, such as ridesharing applications. 
Other forms of online work create even more complex problems, such as when work 
is disguised as an innocuous task like entering a code or answering a question, or 
when work is gamified and hidden as a leisure activity. Other issues involve internet 
users making contributions to online communities, believing their efforts are 
volunteer, when in fact they are being monetized by others. 
To date, courts in the United States have largely failed to recognize what is 
happening in these new online work cases, and plaintiffs have yet to find a solid 
doctrinal ground for recovery. Contract law is stymied in many of these online work 
situations because assent—widely acknowledged as foundational to contract—is 
generally absent. In some of these situations, one party was unaware that work was 
even being performed, or that their work might later be monetized. A comparative 
approach with law in the United Kingdom is therefore helpful. Even though the U.S. 
courts that have examined these cases have purported to use an unjust enrichment 
or restitution formulation to analyze the issues, in reality they are defaulting to 
traditional notions of agreement or assent that are grounded in contract law. 
Referring to the more richly nuanced and developed law of unjust enrichment and 
restitution in U.K. law may result in a more fruitful and well-reasoned analysis of 
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online work cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most internet users are familiar with the process in which they are asked 
to retype a distorted display of letters and numbers to sign up for an email 
list or post a comment on a blog. These garbled sequences are known as 
“Captchas.”1 The word “Captcha” is an acronym, which stands for 
Completely Automated Public Turing Test To Tell Computers and Humans 
Apart.2 The reference to “Turing” in the acronym is based on the famous test 
used to distinguish answers to questions given by humans from answers 
given by computers.3 Captchas help to distinguish internet users who are real 
 
 1 CAPTCHA: Telling Humans and Computers Apart Automatically, CAPTCHA.NET, 
http://www.captcha.net/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2017). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Sara Robinson, Human or Computer? Take This Test, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10. 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/10/science/human-or-computer-take-this-test.html; see 
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people from automated scripts or programs (known as “robots” or “bots”).4 
Such safeguards protect websites from spammers or hackers who might 
otherwise try to overwhelm or take down blogs, email lists, or websites with 
automated comment posts or requests.5 Most users understand that they are 
inserting the letters and numbers as a type of security measure, which is 
worth the time and minor inconvenience.6 
Captchas have long been a fixture of the web since they were invented 
in 2000 by a Carnegie Mellon computer science graduate student, Luis von 
Ahn.7 Users have become accustomed to the idea that they need to fill in a 
Captcha code to gain access to various website services, but this has shifted 
to being asked to insert a second verification. These second verifications, 
known as “reCaptchas,” also look like random combinations of numbers and 
letters.8 But these “reCaptchas” are far from random. Rather, they are small 
bits of transcription that could not be identified by computer scanners and 
need a human eye to do the work.9 After the Captcha technology was sold to 
Google in 2009, Google expanded upon the original idea, enlisting its 
millions of users to do free work for both Google Books and Google Maps.10 
While filling out the second code takes only a few additional seconds for the 
individual user, when multiplied by millions of users, the aggregate amount 
 
also Gary Marcus, What Comes After the Turing Test, NEW YORKER (June 9, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/what-comes-after-the-turing-test (explaining the 
role of the Turing test in spurring the growth of artificial intelligence). For more on Alan 
Turing, the originator of the test and visionary in the field of artificial intelligence, see Emma 
C. Fitzsimmons, Alan Turing, Enigma Code-Breaker and Computer Pioneer, Wins Royal 
Pardon, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/24/world/europe/alan-turing-enigma-code-breaker-and-
computer-pioneer-wins-royal-pardon.html. 
 4 Avi Loewenstein, Note, Ticket Sniping, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 243, 
247 (2010) (describing how Captchas are used to prevent the problem of ticket sniping). 
 5 Harnessing Human Computation, ECONOMIST (June 1, 2013), 
https://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21578514-luis-von-ahn-helped-
save-internet-spammers-his-larger-quest-put. 
 6 See id.; see also Robinson, supra note 3. 
 7 Brian de Graft, Meet Luis von Ahn: The Man You’ve Worked for, Without Knowing 
It, NEXT WEB (Aug. 17, 2016), https://thenextweb.com/insider/2016/08/17/meet-luis-van-
ahn-man-youve-worked-without-knowing/#.tnw_j74WwfEY. 
 8 See Sarah Perez, Google Now Using ReCAPTCHA to Decode Street View Addresses, 
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 29, 2012), https://techcrunch.com/2012/03/29/google-now-using-
recaptcha-to-decode-street-view-addresses/. 
 9 See Creation of Value, GOOGLE RECAPTCHA, 
https://www.google.com/recaptcha/intro/#creation-of-value (last visited Sept. 11, 2017). 
 10 See id.; Leena Rao, Google Acquires reCaptcha to Power Scanning for Google Books 
and Google News, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 16, 2009), 
https://techcrunch.com/2009/09/16/google-acquires-recaptcha-to-power-scanning-for-
google-books-and-google-news/. 
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of transcription work that could be accomplished is staggeringly large.11 
In Rojas-Lozano v. Google, Inc.,12 class action plaintiffs brought a 
federal case seeking financial recovery for the value of the time that users 
had invested in working (without knowledge) through reCaptchas.13 The 
plaintiffs argued that they had all, in fact, been working for Google without 
compensation, and that this was either a deceptive trade practice or a form 
of unjust enrichment. However, the court in Rojas-Lozano granted Google’s 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.14 The court 
found that the elements pleaded did not amount to misrepresentation.15 
Further, the court held that the plaintiffs could not make out the elements of 
a California consumer law claim, as they had suffered no detrimental reliance 
or damage.16 Even if the profit that Google would make was not revealed to 
users, the court pointed out that any harm to an individual plaintiff would be 
de minimus due to the very small amount of time that each person would 
spend in filling out a reCaptcha.17 
The court went on to discuss the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim, 
which it categorized as a claim in quasi-contract or restitution.18 The court’s 
discussion of restitution theory was confined to two brief paragraphs, 
concluding in a summary fashion that there was no misrepresentation or 
omission from the defendants; and that even if there had been, there had been 
no reliance or damage based on the omission.19 Throughout the opinion, the 
court emphasized the small amount of time that any one individual had spent 
on the reCaptchas. 
The court’s reasoning in Rojas-Lozano left a great deal to be desired. 
While the court acknowledged that Google had made a profit based on the 
plaintiffs’ work, the court also minimized this point by noting that the time 
 
 11 De Graft, supra note 7 (estimating that the New York Times archives were quickly 
digitized thanks to this transcription process). Interestingly, Google has recently been 
listening to complaints that reCaptcha is annoying and wastes users’ time; but the 
“NoCaptcha” system that they are now testing has privacy watchdogs upset, rather than asking 
users to enter a code it tracks and monitors users to ensure that they are not bots. Lara 
O’Reilly, Google’s New CAPTCHA Security Login Raises ‘Legitimate Privacy Concerns,’ 
BU. INSIDER (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/google-no-captcha-adtruth-
privacy-research-2015-2. 
 12 159 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
 13 See id. at 1106–07. 
 14 See id. at 1106. 
 15 See id. at 1113–14. 
 16 See id. at 1114. 
 17 See id. at 1115. 
 18 See id. at 1120. 
 19 Id. 
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involved for each user was extremely small.20 To be sure, an individual 
inserting a reCaptcha code involves only a few seconds, but in the aggregate, 
the time that Google had harnessed was considerable. Further, the court 
seems to have misunderstood the basis for awarding a remedy in an unjust 
enrichment case.21 To be sure, it is difficult to tell, as the court barely 
considered the theory before summarily foreclosing it.  
The type of unknowing or even unconscious labor that was taking place 
in the reCaptcha situation is not an isolated phenomenon. As technology 
advances and new ways of working are developed, it has become fruitful to 
mix work and leisure, which previously were considered binary opposites. 
A prior article by the author, The Gamification of Work, describes how 
games can be deployed to turn boring tasks into more fun activities, and how 
games themselves (like World of Warcraft) can be turned into work by 
monetizing different elements of the games.22 The portmanteau “playbor” 
describes situations in which online games combine work with fun or 
“play.”23 Other forms of work are breaking down the old divide between 
those who produce products and those who consume them. New websites, 
such as Threadless, allow their customers both to design products like T-
shirts and also to purchase them.24 Known as “prosumers,” website or app 
users may bear responsibility for both creation of content or products as well 
as their use or consumption.25 
These are just some examples of major changes that are occurring to the 
fundamental structure and nature of the labor relationship. Gig economy 
platforms on websites or cell phone apps are also part and parcel of these 
 
 20 Id. at 1115. 
 21  The court summed up this point by stating in conclusory fashion: “Plaintiff has also 
not alleged that she suffered any damages as a result of the alleged misrepresentation. At best, 
she alleges that Google profited from her allegedly uniformed decision to complete the two-
word reCAPTCHA. But Google’s profit is not Plaintiff’s damage.” Id. at 1114–15. 
 22 See Miriam A. Cherry, The Gamification of Work, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 851 (2012). 
See generally KEVIN WERBACH & DAN HUNTER, FOR THE WIN: HOW GAME THINKING CAN 
REVOLUTIONIZE YOUR BUSINESS (2012). 
 23 Andrew Ross, In Search of the Lost Paycheck, in DIGITAL LABOR: THE INTERNET AS 
PLAYGROUND AND FACTORY 13, 26 (Trebor Scholz ed., 2013). 
 24 THREADLESS, www.threadless.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2017); see also JEFF HOWE, 
CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS 1–3 
(2008) (describing the “Threadless” website). 
 25 See generally Marie-Christine Pauwels, Work and Prosumerism: Collaborative 
Consumption in the United States, in DIGITAL LABOUR AND PROSUMER CAPITALISM: THE US 
MATRIX 66 (Olivier Frayssé & Mathieu O’Neil eds., 2015). Note that “prosumers” is a new 
name but that the idea that customers would also be working is an older one. See, e.g., 
MICHAEL PALM, TECHNOLOGIES OF CONSUMER LABOR: A HISTORY OF SELF-SERVICE 26, 57–
59 (2016) (detailing history of consumer work in the grocery store and on the telephone). 
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changes. While traditional “employment” relationships involved a steady 
forty-hour work week and accompanying benefits, the gig economy instead 
stresses limited commitment and extreme flexibility.26 Rather than having an 
individual assigned employee to take on tasks as work arises, the work is 
broken down into smaller pieces and placed out via internet or cellular phone 
app on an “open call.”27 Workers sign in and complete tasks at their own 
pace and on their own time. There are no obligations of the worker or the 
platform to each other past the conclusion of one particular gig or task.28 
What all of these new forms of work have in common is that they are 
largely intermediated by and through standardized form contracts. In most 
instances the terms of these contracts are contained in end user license 
agreements (“EULAs”), which are displayed in an online format, sometimes 
with scrollable texts.29 Some EULAs are presented in a format that requires 
the user to click “I agree” before continuing to use the site or platform. 
Courts have held that the “click” signifies an objective assent to the form 
terms.30 Others are presented in a scattered way throughout the website or 
platform. Known as “browsewrap,” these kind of contracts require no 
manifestation of assent and thus are not typically enforceable.31 Regardless, 
like many online adhesion contracts, the contracts in the sharing economy 
contain many one-sided terms that are favorable to the website or platform.32 
EULAs for many on-demand economy companies contain a statement that 
the work is done on an “independent contractor” basis and that no employee 
benefits are designated or even desired. Currently, courts in the United States 
are grappling mightily with the classification problem. In the employment 
law context, courts have typically looked past the nomenclature used by the 
parties.33 Instead, courts delve into the true substance of the relationship to 
determine indicia of employment, including the ability to control the worker 
 
 26 See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation 
of Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577 (2016). 
 27 See Frederick E. Allen, Names You Need to Know: Jeff Howe, FORBES (Nov. 11, 
2010), https://www.forbes.com/sites/frederickallen/2010/11/11/names-you-need-to-know-
jeff-howe/#5ff50211759d. See generally HOWE, supra note 24. 
 28 Cherry, supra note 26, at 581–82. See generally Charlotte Garden, Disrupting Work 
Law: Arbitration in the Gig Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming Fall 2017). 
 29 See, e.g., Lyft Terms of Service, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/terms (last visited Sept. 
12, 2017). 
 30 Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 31 Id. at 836. 
 32 See NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 2, 4 
(2013). 
 33 See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of Employment: Labor Law 
Regulation of Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 663–65 (1996). 
2017] THE SHARING ECONOMY AND THE EDGES OF CONTRACT LAW  
or the worker’s economic dependency.34 Even beyond this relatively well-
known classification debate, interesting disguised forms of online work are 
presenting a new and difficult set of problems for both contract law and the 
law of unjust enrichment and restitution.35 
The first part of this Article provides the relevant background needed 
for a full discussion of the on-demand or sharing economy. The second part 
discusses the evolving precedents in the United States and in the United 
Kingdom on the issue of employee status for on-demand economy workers. 
Perhaps surprisingly, even though the on-demand economy started in the San 
Francisco Bay Area, and lawsuits have been ongoing for several years now, 
as of 2016, there still is no caselaw precedent in the United States answering 
whether on-demand workers are independent contractors or employees.36 In 
contrast, the Council of London Employment Tribunal found that Uber 
drivers did, in fact, meet the definition of employees and thus were entitled 
to the accompanying rights and benefits of that status.37 
The third part of this Article looks to the new types of on-demand labor 
where the work is being carried out wholly within cyberspace. In some 
instances, these new forms of work do not look anything like “traditional” 
forms of work at all.38 Work may be disguised as part of a game, with the 
work product or useful data that is produced only a tiny fraction of a person’s 
time or even consciousness. In other instances, work may seem to be an 
innocuous computer program. In still others, users share their time and 
contribute their efforts online to a “community,” only to later discover that 
it is a commodified space and someone else has profited from their efforts.39 
These instances, which mostly amount to unpaid or in some instances 
even unacknowledged or unconscious labor on the internet, have been the 
subject of lawsuits in the United States. These cases have been brought by 
plaintiffs under contract law, and they have largely been rejected under 
 
 34 See id.; infra note 86 and accompanying text. Note also that terms in the EULAs that 
involve arbitration agreements or class action waivers are also becoming more important. See 
Garden, supra note 28. 
 35 See infra Part IV. 
 36 See infra Section II.B. 
 37 Aslam v. Uber B.V. [2017] IRLR 4 [86]. 
 38 Of course, use of the words “traditional work” is somewhat misleading, as there are 
many forms of work that are unrecognized, hidden, and invisible. See INVISIBLE LABOR: 
HIDDEN WORK IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 3–5 (Marion G. Crain, Winifred R. Poster & 
Miriam A. Cherry eds., 2016). But “traditional work” can be used as a shorthand for forms of 
work that we are used to seeing, work that is remunerated, takes place at a factory, office, or 
place of business, within the bounds of set and standardized work hours. See id. at 3. 
 39 See infra Part III. 
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traditional contract theory.40 While these cases have largely been 
unsuccessful in the United States to date, it is possible that they might gain 
more traction in the United Kingdom, where restitution and unjust 
enrichment have flowered into a recognized and developed field of 
jurisprudence.41 Although the U.S. cases have seen interesting fact patterns 
dealing with virtual and online work, the U.S. courts lack a fundamental 
familiarity with restitution law to deal with the topic adequately. The United 
Kingdom, on the other hand, has a great deal of theoretical writing and legal 
cases on the topic of restitution and unjust enrichment, but has yet to apply 
unjust enrichment doctrine in reference to any concrete disputes about online 
labor.42 The last part of the Article examines the more expansive ideas of 
restitution developed in the United Kingdom. These ideas provide assistance 
in thinking through the current issues and disputes surrounding global virtual 
work issues. For instance, one could ask how the reCaptcha case would have 
been decided if it had been brought in the United Kingdom under an unjust 
enrichment theory. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 
The so-called “shared,” “sharing,” “gig,” or “on-demand” economy43 
has its roots in longstanding community exchange structures in the United 
States. While often informal and based on religious community, kinship, or 
frontier ties, many communities set up exchange systems based on time 
sharing or barter.44 Tool exchanges and book lending libraries were 
prototypes of these collective efforts that depended upon a mix of altruism, 
government funding, and community initiative. 45 
The internet, mobile phones, and computer technology provided a boost 
 
 40 See infra Section II.A. 
 41 See infra Section IV.B. 
 42 See infra Section IV.B. 
 43 The terminology for these new forms of business and work is still being debated. 
“Shared” economy is the terminology of the European Union and the U.K., while “sharing” 
economy is more common in the United States. That said, there is a debate about whether 
either “shared” or “sharing” is the correct term at all, given that these are mostly for-profit 
businesses in the sector. Because of the title of the Symposium panel (“Share Economy and 
the Edges of Contract Law”), I am using the terms interchangeably, even while recognizing 
that “sharing” or “shared” economy may be a misnomer. See Steven Greenhouse, The 
Whatchamacallit Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/the-whatchamacallit-economy.html. 
 44 The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-
economy. 
 45 See Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The LEGAL Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 
27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 3 (2012); see also Cherry, supra note 23, at 579. 
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to new forms of sharing and business structures, matching providers or 
sellers with those eager for goods and services.46 Transaction costs fell, and 
entering the 2010s, average computer users were able to create markets for 
used or specialty goods on outlets such as Amazon, Etsy, and eBay.47 
Underutilized or unused resources (like an extra room or above-garage 
apartment) could be rented out through space-sharing website AirBnB.48 
Many people began to buy and sell small pieces of their time and labor 
through mobile cell-phone platforms or online marketplaces for work. 
Technological platforms offered innovations; instead of buying or 
selling a good, users of certain platforms could rent access to what they 
needed.49 A driver with a private car could transform an ordinary morning 
commute into a profit-generating enterprise by picking up a passenger 
through Uber or Lyft.50 Other websites, like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 
crowdsourced computer tasks to a global market of workers, using only very 
small slices of time.51 Websites that were part of “prosumer” movements 
involved customers in design or marketing decisions, only to then sell those 
same consumers products.52 On-demand services seemed to thrive in an 
environment that was increasingly globalized, anonymous, and—with 
lowered transaction costs—more efficient. 
Despite their “shared” roots, the irony is that many of these newest 
services or marketplaces are for-profit entities that are highly commodified; 
everything and anything is now being monetized, from slices of time, to what 
were formerly shared or open access resources. Back in 2013, the author 
examined how some parts of the internet were based on a “sharing” model 
while others were highly commoditized.53 While many businesses, like 
Craigslist, struggled with these issues of community access and profit 
throughout the early and mid 2000s, many later businesses, like Uber, had 
the pursuit of profit as their mainline goal.54 Despite an outward veneer of 
 
 46 See Cherry, supra note 26, at 577. 
 47 See Miriam A. Cherry, Cyber Commodification, 72 MD. L. REV. 381, 384–85 (2013). 
 48 See Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES 
(Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-
unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See Start Driving with Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/ (last visited Sept. 
12, 2017). 
 51 AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2017). 
 52 See HOWE, supra note 24, at 2, 4. 
 53 See generally Cherry, supra note 47. 
 54 See id. at 418–21; John Biggs, The Inside Story of the Rise and Rise of Uber, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 7, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/07/the-inside-story-of-the-rise-
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sharing and an appeal to the community, many of these newest 
crowdsourcing and labor sites were focused on profit maximization, to the 
detriment of labor standards.55 The next Section looks at the legal treatment 
of for-profit platforms that are used to intermediate work and labor relations, 
providing a comparative assessment of the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 
II. THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF PLATFORM WORK IN THE U.S. AND U.K. 
 A 2016 survey by TIME Magazine revealed that approximately 45 
million people had participated in some way in the on-demand economy.56 
While some have quibbled with these statistics,57 most would readily agree 
that there has been rapid growth in the on-demand sector. The new 
companies responsible for such growth include those sites that offer services 
in the real world, like Handy58 and Instacart,59 as well as well-known 
ridesharing services like Uber and Lyft. They also include platforms where 
the work takes place wholly online, like the crowdsourced computer tasks 
on Amazon Mechanical Turk.60 These platforms tend to classify their 
workers as “independent contractors” under their terms of use, even if that 
description may not be legally accurate.61 Workers have struck back by 
bringing class action lawsuits, claiming they should rightfully be classified 
as employees.62 This question of misclassification is particularly important 
 
and-rise-of-uber/. 
 55 See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an 
Alternative Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 241, 292 (2015) (arguing that current 
forms of regulation do not fit well with the sharing economy because of a lack of fit with 
traditional business models). 
 56 Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, TIME (Jan. 6, 
2016), http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll/. 
 57 See Cole Stangler, December Jobs Report: How Many Gig Economy Workers Are 
There, Really?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2016, 7:33 AM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/december-jobs-report-how-many-gig-economy-workers-are-there-
really-2255765. Prominent economists Alan Kreuger and Larry Mishel both quibble with the 
numbers in the Time survey, arguing that the numbers of on-demand economy workers are 
far lower. Id. There may be political or ideological reasons for minimizing the gig economy, 
including staving off regulation (from the right) or perhaps appealing to traditional union 
constituencies and minimizing technological change (from the left). See Lawrence Mishel, 
Uber is Not the Future of Work, ATLANTIC (Nov. 16, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/11/uber-is-not-the-future-of-
work/415905/. 
 58 HANDY, http://www.handy.com/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
 59 INSTACART, https://www.instacart.com/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
 60 AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, supra note 51. 
 61 See, e.g., Lyft Terms of Service, supra note 29. 
 62 Cherry, supra note 26 at 578. 
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because employee status is a “gateway” to many of the rights and benefits 
provided under employment law.63 
A. Litigation in the United States 
Although the ridesharing cases involving Uber and Lyft have been the 
most high profile on-demand economy cases, there are many other ongoing 
cases in the United States regarding the employee status of platform 
workers.64 The author has been following many of those cases and has 
described the stories and trends in these litigations in other published work.65 
These platform workers perform home repair services,66 cleaning services,67 
grocery delivery and errand services,68 and piecemeal computer tasks 
intermediated by a platform.69 Despite the varying nature of these tasks, the 
central issue in all of these cases is the same: whether the contract’s 
description of the work as that done by an “independent contractor” should 
control, or whether the control or economic realities test would lead to a 
different result. Some of these cases have been sent to arbitration, per the 
terms and conditions, never to be heard from again; others have settled 
without resolving the question of employee status.70 
The lawsuits over transportation service networks have certainly 
received a large share of attention. In the two cases Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.71 and 
O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.72 drivers filed class action wage and 
hour claims in the Northern District of California.73 The availability of a 
remedy under wage and hour laws, however, depends upon employee 
status.74 As will be discussed in more depth below, U.S. law does not depend 
simply on the label assigned by the parties, but rather whether a worker is an 
employee or independent contractor is determined through one of two 
 
 63 For example, the rights to minimum wage, protection from discrimination, 
unemployment insurance, and worker’s compensation are only available for those workers 
who qualify as employees under the federal statutes that deal with those topics. Id. 
 64 For a full discussion of these ongoing cases, see id. at 579–93. 
 65 See id. 
 66 See id. at 586. 
 67 See id. at 588. 
 68 See id. at 584. 
 69 See id. at 592. 
 70 See id. at 581–85. 
 71 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 72 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 73 See Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1070; O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135. 
 74 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012) (defining “employee” for the purposes of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act). 
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doctrinal tests: the control test or the entrepreneurial activities test.75 
Deriving from cases and decisions in the area of agency law, the control 
test, as its name hints, focuses on a principal’s right to control the agent 
working on its behalf.76 The right to control is the hallmark or cornerstone of 
being an employer, and a multifactored test for measuring the indicia of 
control has developed through the caselaw. Some of these indicia of control 
that lead to a finding of employee status are the ability to control the method 
and ways in which the work is performed, ability to set the hours of work, 
and the ability to provide the employee with direction.77 On the other hand, 
elements that lean toward classification as an independent contractor include 
work that requires high skill, the workers’ provision of their own instruments 
and tools of the trade, workers being able to set their own schedules, and 
payment per project, not per hour.78 
In the entrepreneurial activities test, courts examine the economic 
realities of the working relationship to determine whether the worker is 
acting as an entrepreneur.79 This might include an opportunity for both 
financial gain and loss from the work.80 Such indicia of entrepreneurial 
activity could justify the label of independent contractor. On the other hand, 
if the worker is financially dependent, and there is no potential downside to 
the relationship, that tends to resemble the traditional employee-employer 
relationship.81 In both the control and entrepreneurial activities tests, the 
label affixed to the relationship is one factor in the outcome, but it is certainly 
not dispositive to the determination, as courts will look further into the 
 
 75 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment 
Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 257–58 (2006) (listing factors from caselaw). Relevant cases on this 
subject include Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–26 (1992); 
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 726–30 (1947); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. 
v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 170–72 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 76 Stone, supra note 75, at 261. 
 77 See, e.g., Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 303 
(5th Cir. 1998). 
 78 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 33, at 663 (“Most labor and employment laws assume 
a paradigmatic relationship between an ‘employer’ and ‘employee.’ The employer in this 
model contracts directly with an individual employee to perform an indefinite series or 
duration of tasks, subject to the employer’s actual or potential supervision over the 
employee’s method, manner, time and place of performance. This model describes most 
workers well enough, but there has always been a large pool of workers in alternative 
relationships with recipients of services. Some workers are ‘independent contractors’ who 
contract to perform specific tasks or achieve particular results, but who retain independence 
and self-management over their performance.”). 
 79 See Stone, supra note 75, at 257–58. 
 80 See id. 
 81 See id. 
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substance of the relationship.82 In any event, both tests are known for being 
notoriously malleable, even when dealing with what should be a fairly 
straightforward analysis.83 As the tests themselves are difficult to apply, the 
federal judges of the Northern District of California struggled in the 
ridesharing cases for the appropriate way to characterize the drivers’ 
triangular working relationship with the customers and the platforms.84 This 
issue is especially difficult given the binary nature of employee status.85 In 
the ridesharing cases, some of the factors in the control test point toward an 
employee relationship, while others could be viewed as fitting into an 
independent contractor relationship.86 For example, crowdworker drivers 
have more flexibility in setting their schedules than workers in a traditional 
taxi environment who work a set shift. Drivers also provide their own cars 
and their own cellular telephones, i.e., tools and instrumentalities of the 
work. Finally, and for further discussion later in the Article, EULAs 
contractually label drivers as “independent contractors.”87 
Many factors, however, point toward employee status. Ridesharing 
 
 82 See id. 
 83 Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and 
How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 298 (2001) (“Indeed, in 
the case of employee status, the law encourages ambiguity. On the one hand, employers often 
crave the control they enjoy in a normal employment relationship. On the other, the 
advantages (to employers) of employing workers who are plausibly not employees motivate 
a good deal of arbitrary and questionable ‘non-employee’ classification. It is not uncommon 
to find employees and putative contractors sitting side by side, performing the same work 
without any immediately visible distinguishing characteristics. And the trend of the working 
world is toward greater complexity and variation, driven partly by the temptation to capitalize 
on the fog that obscures the essence of many working relationships.” (footnote omitted)). 
 84 See generally Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015); O’Connor 
v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 85 Again, this has been a longstanding problem. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, Employment Law 
After the Death of Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 101 (1998) (“The new ways of 
working, that I believe challenge normal legal analyses, include such new relations of 
employment as temporary employment placed by an agency and part-time employment 
rendered by people who have no other employer but are treated as contingent workers without 
benefits or implicit promises. They also include ways of working that are not, technically, 
‘employment’ relations under any statute: independent contractors, free-lancers, consultants, 
and people out of the labor market after downsizing or other elimination of former career 
jobs.”). 
 86 See Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1511, 1541–42 (2016) (arguing that many Uber drivers are independent 
contractors); Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 100 
(2015) (noting that some aspects of both employee and independent contractor relationships 
are present in Uber’s business model, but that policy reasons would favor coverage of workers 
as employees). 
 87 Lyft Terms of Service, supra note 29 (“[T]he relationship between the parties under 
this Agreement is solely that of independent contracting parties.”); see Garden, supra note 28. 
 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [85 
platforms exert significant control over drivers, given that both Uber and 
Lyft use customer ratings in order to maintain what amounts to constant 
surveillance over quality of service; customers are essentially deputized to 
run the workforce.88 Many on-demand companies spend a great deal of time 
and effort to implement quality control policies.89 Further, in turning to the 
entrepreneurial activities test, it would seem very difficult to say that there is 
truly the opportunity for entrepreneurial expansion, or gain or loss. As noted 
in an earlier article, the “terminology in a EULA is far from dispositive, as 
such online contracts are known to be extremely one-sided and are construed 
against the drafter. The possibility for exploitation is high, and low-skilled 
workers are those that are most in need of [labor law] protection.”90 
The uncertainty of the legal test combined with a difficult set of facts 
meant that the judges in the ridesharing cases were left with a major 
problem.91 As Judge Vince Chhabria in Cotter v. Lyft, Inc. noted, “the 
jury . . . will be handed a square peg and asked to choose between two round 
holes. The test the California courts have developed over the 20th Century 
for classifying workers isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st Century 
problem.”92 The court denied Lyft’s motion for summary judgment, and for 
a time at least, the case seemed to be headed to trial.93 
Faced with the uncertainty of jury verdicts, perhaps a settlement was 
unsurprising. In January 2016, Lyft agreed to pay $12.25 million to resolve 
their wage and hour claims.94 In addition, Lyft pledged to provide drivers 
with additional due process rights before termination. Many drivers had 
complained about the previous summary method of dismissal, especially 
because the threshold rating for dismissal was actually quite high. Out of a 
five-point scale, with one being “terrible” and five being “terrific,” drivers 
were at risk of being terminated from the app if they fell below a threshold 
rating of 4.8.95 Under the settlement, rather than being summarily deactivated 
 
 88 Alex Rosenblat, The Truth About How Uber’s App Manages Drivers, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Apr. 6, 2016), http://hbr.org/2016/04/the-truth-about-how-ubers-app-manages-drivers. 
 89 See, e.g., id. 
 90 Cherry, supra note 26 at 583. 
 91 See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1081–82 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 92 Id. at 1081. 
 93 Id. at 1080. 
 94 Maya Kosoff, Lyft Just Agreed to Pay More than $12 Million to Settle a Driver 
Lawsuit—Here’s What That Means for Its Drivers, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 27, 2016, 9:34 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/what-lyfts-12-million-settlement-means-for-drivers-2016-
1. 
 95 See LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/213586008-Driver-and-Passenger-
Ratings (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (explaining that drivers “may want to consider ways to 
improve” their ratings if below 4.8). 
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(i.e., kicked off) from the app with no explanation, the settlement required 
the platform to provide a driver with the reason for termination.96 Further, if 
the reason given is low user ratings, the driver would be given an opportunity 
to improve. Finally, drivers would have the ability to challenge a 
deactivation through an arbitration proceeding if they believe they were 
deactivated outside the permitted reasons.97 Despite the terms of the 
proposed settlement on compensation and deactivation, the underlying issue 
of employee status remained unresolved.98 Only a few months later, Judge 
Chhabria rejected the Lyft settlement as inadequate and sent the parties back 
for additional negotiations, which resulted in a financially enhanced 
settlement for the drivers of $27 million.99 Still, there is no more certainty 
about the employment status of Lyft drivers than before the lawsuit began. 
A similar settlement story is in the process of playing out in O’Connor 
v. Uber Technologies, Inc. A class of Uber drivers had been certified and the 
case was set for trial in summer of 2016.100 In advance of the trial, however, 
in April 2016, the parties announced a $100 million settlement of claims.101 
While initially that seems like a large account, given the number of drivers, 
the result would be the recovery of only small or nominal payment for each 
driver.102 As in the Lyft settlement, the ultimate question of employee 
misclassification was not resolved.103 
Judge Edward Chen, however, rejected the settlement as inadequate, and 
as of the writing of this Article, the parties are still negotiating.104 Judge Chen 
wrote that certain state statutory claims (California’s Private Attorneys 
General Act, or “PAGA” claims) could not be waived through an adhesive 
 
 96 See Kosoff supra note 94. 
 97 See id. 
 98 Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 930, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2016). On the role of 
arbitration clauses in the settlement of O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 
1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015), see Katherine V.W. Stone, Uber and Arbitration: A Lethal 
Combination, ECON. POL’Y INST.: WORKING ECONOMICS BLOG (May 24, 2016, 11:33 AM), 
http://www.epi.org/blog/uber-and-arbitration-a-lethal-combination/. 
 99 Tracey Lien, Judge Approves Lyft’s $27-Million Class-Action Settlement with 
Drivers, L.A. TIMES (June 23, 2016, 6:13 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-lyft-settlement-approval-20160623-
snap-story.html. 
 100 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 311 F.R.D. 547, 550–51 (N.D. Cal 2015). 
 101 Mike Isaac & Noam Scheiber, Uber Settles Cases with Concessions, but Drivers Stay 
Freelancers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/technology/uber-settles-cases-with-concessions-but-
drivers-stay-freelancers.html. 
 102 See id. (reporting that the certified class contained roughly 385,000 drivers). 
 103 Id. 
 104 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d. 1110, 1113 (N.D. Cal 2016). 
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EULA given that these PAGA claims were potentially quite valuable, worth 
upward of $1 billion.105 At the same time, the possible need to arbitrate these 
claims or pursue them in individual actions could undermine their value. 
Regardless of the monetary value of the claims, the underlying question of 
employee status of the drivers does not seem any closer to being resolved. 
Interestingly, there are some long-term trends relevant to contract law 
that can be gleaned from the partial decisions and rulings in the United 
States. One is the growth in use of arbitration and class-waiver provisions in 
EULAs, and the courts’ willingness to enforce them, even when they seem 
one-sided and the product of contracts of adhesion.106 Although perhaps not 
directly relevant to issues in the sharing economy, the trend toward 
arbitration through EULAs is one that already seems to be having an effect 
on the incentives of litigation.107 
Aside from issues of forum, there is an emerging pushback from 
numerous U.S. federal courts on the adequacy of the settlement agreements. 
In both the O’Connor v. Uber and Cotter v. Lyft cases, courts rejected the 
initial settlement agreements as inadequate for the workers and sent the 
 
 105 Id. at 1132–35. 
 106 Updated analyses of these cases are provided by Garden, supra note 28. For an old 
look at many of the arbitration issues as they appeared in 1998, see Miriam A. Cherry, Note, 
Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration: Using Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis to Invalidate 
Employment Contracts That Discriminate, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 267 (1998). 
 107 For more updated and recent accounts of the movement toward arbitration as a way 
of managing workplace liability for employers, see Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: 
How American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal 
Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2015) (“Today employers, with substantial 
assistance from the Supreme Court, are using mandatory arbitration clauses to ‘disarm’ 
employees, effectively preventing them from bringing most individual or class claims and 
thereby obtaining access to justice. It has been estimated that roughly 20% of the non-
unionized American workforce is covered by mandatory arbitration provisions, and this 
number may well increase.” (footnotes omitted)). For more on arbitration as a method of 
containing costs toward consumers, see Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do 
Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 433, 434–37 
(2010); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of 
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 
871 (2008) (“We provide the first study of varying use of arbitration clauses across contracts 
within the same firms. Using a sample of 26 consumer contracts and 164 nonconsumer 
contracts from large public corporations, we compared the use of arbitration clauses in firms’ 
consumer and nonconsumer contracts. Over three-quarters of the consumer agreements 
provided for mandatory arbitration but less than 10% of the firms’ material nonconsumer, 
nonemployment contracts included arbitration clauses. The absence of arbitration provisions 
in the vast majority of material contracts suggests that, ex ante, many firms value, even prefer, 
litigation over arbitration to resolve disputes with peers. Our data suggest that the frequent 
use of arbitration clauses in the same firms’ consumer contracts may be an effort to preclude 
aggregate consumer action rather than, as often claimed, an effort to promote fair and efficient 
dispute resolution.”). 
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parties back for additional negotiation.108 While the rulings stop short of 
holding that the drivers are employees, they may signal that judges believe 
that the workers’ substantive claims are valuable. Again, the issue of 
employee status has not been definitively decided by a court in the United 
States, so for the meantime this question remains unresolved.109 
B. Litigation in the United Kingdom 
Unlike the U.S. Uber and Lyft settlements, which do not provide much 
in the way of resolution to the employee status issue, a recent decision from 
the Employment Tribunal in London reached a more definitive answer. In 
the case of Aslam v. Uber B.V.,110 the London Employment Tribunal ruled 
that the drivers were employees of Uber. At first the Tribunal considered, 
but rejected, Uber’s contention that it was merely a software company, not a 
provider of labor services. The Tribunal noted that it would be 
unreal to deny that Uber is in business as a supplier of transportation 
services. Simple common sense argues to the contrary. . . . One 
might ask: Whose product range is it if not Uber’s? The “products” 
speak for themselves: they are a variety of driving services. Mr. 
Aslam does not offer such a range. Nor does Mr. Farrar, or any 
other solo driver. . . . “Uber does not simply sell software; it sells 
rides. Uber is no more a ‘technology company’ than Yellow Cab is 
a ‘technology company’ because it uses CB radios to dispatch taxi 
cabs.”111 
Rather, the Tribunal felt that Uber’s basic business model involved the 
provision of transportation. The Tribunal also suggested that the attempt to 
circumvent an employment relationship by using online contracts and 
inventing new terminology seemed to be a form of legerdemain.112 
The Tribunal also spent a good deal of time analyzing the web of 
contracts between Uber and its drivers as well as Uber and its passengers. 
Regarding the former relationship, the Tribunal was extremely critical, 
noting that 
the terms on which Uber rely do not correspond with the reality of 
 
 108 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (denying 
plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 
176 F. Supp. 3d 930 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (denying motion for preliminary approval of class 
action settlement). 
 109 See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (granting 
motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement). 
 110 [2017] IRLR 4 [86]. 
 111 Id. [89] (quoting O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015)). 
 112 See id. [87]. 
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the relationship between the organisation and the drivers. 
Accordingly, the Tribunal is free to disregard them. As is often the 
case, the problem stems at least in part from the unequal bargaining 
positions of the contracting parties . . . . Many Uber drivers (a 
substantial proportion of whom, we understand, do not speak 
English as their first language) will not be accustomed to reading 
and interpreting dense legal documents couched in impenetrable 
prose. This is . . . an excellent illustration . . . of “armies of lawyers” 
contriving documents in their clients’ interests which simply 
misrepresent the true rights and obligations on both sides.113 
The court, therefore, relied on its thirteen-point analysis to show that Uber 
was not working for the drivers; instead, the drivers were working for 
Uber.114 These points included key issues of recruitment, control over 
information regarding the passengers, Uber’s setting of default routes, 
pricing structures, conditions on drivers, instructions for drivers, the 
establishment of disciplinary and rating systems, and the fact that Uber 
handles complaints from passengers.115 While not identical, the list of factors 
considered tracks many of the factors in the U.S. control test.116 That said, 
Uber is appealing the Employment Tribunal’s opinion, throwing a great deal 
of resources and legal expertise at the problem.117 In September 2017, 
Transport for London refused to renew Uber’s transport license due to a 
concerns about the company’s lack of corporate social responsibility.118 Uber 
is appealing this licensure determination as well.119 
III. COMPUTER TASKS AND LABOR ON THE INTERNET: APPLICATION OF 
PRINCIPLES OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION 
The ridesharing cases and many of the other sharing economy cases 
 
 113 Id. [96]. 
 114 See id. [92], [95]. The analysis proceeded under the Employment Rights Act 1996, 
Section 230(3)(b), referred to in the decision as a “limb (b)” type case. Id. [98]. 
 115 Id. [92]. 
 116 See supra Section II.A. 
 117 See Robert Booth, Uber Granted Right to Appeal Against Ruling on UK Drivers’ 
Rights, GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/19/uber-appeal-uk-employment-ruling-
drivers-working-rights. 
 118 Sarah Butler & Gwyn Topham, Uber Stripped of London License Due to Lack of 
Corporate Responsibility, GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/22/uber-licence-transport-for-london-tfl; 
Prashant S. Rao & Mike Isaac, Uber Loses License to Operate in London, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/business/uber-london.html?_r=0. 
 119 See Butler & Topham, supra note 118. 
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(house cleaning, delivery services, and the like), all involved platforms or 
mobile apps that coordinate work that happens in the real world. In addition 
to these types of work, there are also many forms of gig work that do not 
require real world interactions. Rather they involve tasks, jobs, and work that 
are performed wholly on the computer, in cyberspace. From Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, which matches up computer workers with small tasks, like 
transcription or photo-tagging, to other sites that employ web designers and 
programmers through mechanisms like bidding or contests, these forms of 
cyberspace-only crowdwork are becoming more common.120 As an example 
of computer-based crowdwork, imagine taking a large-scale e-commerce 
project and breaking it into its smaller parts, such as writing product 
descriptions or taking photos of the goods being sold.121 Platforms then 
promulgate an “open call” that allows thousands of workers all over the 
world to complete these micro-tasks. After thousands of workers complete 
their tasks, computers re-aggregate and compile their work to finish the 
larger assignment. 
Workers on these types of cyber crowdworking cites are also bringing 
lawsuits, challenging sub-minimum wage pay. In Otey v. CrowdFlower, 
Inc.,122 a group of computer workers challenged the pay practices of a 
crowdworking platform, which they alleged paid less than the U.S. minimum 
wage.123 CrowdFlower is a platform specializing in micro-task computer 
work.124 In 2014, workers brought suit against CrowdFlower under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)125 and Oregon’s minimum wage law for 
failure to pay adequate wages.126 In response, CrowdFlower argued that the 
 
 120 See AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, supra note 51; INNOCENTIVE, 
www.innocentive.com (last Sept. 15, 2017) (linking creative problem solvers with posted 
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 121 See Randall Stross, When the Assembly Line Moves Online, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/31/business/31digi.html. 
 122 No. 12-cv-05524-JST, 2014 WL 1477630 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014). 
 123 See id. at *1. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
 126 Otey, 2014 WL 1477630, at *1. In addition to the lawsuit, other stories have appeared 
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Experience as a TaskRabbit Drone, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2011), 
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micro-task workers were independent contractors, based on the terms in the 
EULA, and thus the minimum wage laws would not apply.127 
The employee status question, however, was foreclosed by settlement 
before it could be decided by the court.128 By the terms of the settlement, 
CrowdFlower agreed to compensate the workers for the difference between 
their actual pay and the statutory minimum wage.129 CrowdFlower also 
agreed to pay attorney’s fees and to cease involvement in crowdwork for ten 
years.130 Judge Tigar, however, rejected the settlement as inadequate,131 
instead approving a revised settlement that increased the amount of money 
paid to $585,507, inclusive of attorney’s fees.132 The finalized settlement, 
however, contained no ban on CrowdFlower’s crowdwork operations.133 
The CrowdFlower settlement might be viewed as encouraging to other 
plaintiffs bringing minimum wage lawsuits for crowdwork. The success in 
this case in part hinged on the “smoking gun” of several YouTube videos 
referenced in the plaintiff’s complaint. The complaint alleged that these 
(now-removed) YouTube videos showed the CrowdFlower CEO boasting 
that there was no requirement to pay workers minimum wage.134 In a 
contemporaneous interview with the BBC, (the record of which is still 
available online), the CrowdFlower CEO stated that “we almost trick the 
game players into doing something useful for the world while playing these 
games. Just do ten minutes of real work that a real company can use, and 
we’ll give you a virtual tractor. That way everyone wins.”135 Willful or bad 
faith violations of the FLSA may result in additional liquidated damages. 
Because there was the possibility the plaintiffs could establish such a willful 
violation, one assumes that CrowdFlower chose to settle rather than run a 
risk that additional damages would be awarded in litigation. 
Two cases on classification and online work that had interesting 
potential to set precedent (but that ended up in arbitration or settling) 
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involved Netflix, the popular movie and television streaming service. These 
two cases, Akbay v. Netflix,136 and Moss v. Netflix,137 involved virtual editors, 
who were paid to sign into the Netflix site and select representative scenes 
and still shots for use on the Netflix platform.138 Essentially, these video 
editors were responsible for choosing the “still shot” that comes up to 
represent an episode or movie on the Netflix site. This is invisible work in 
the sense that not many users are even aware that people manually choose 
these still shots or selecting scenes; many users likely believe this is an 
automated process. These backstage editors performed their duties in a 
remote location and signed in through a website.139 The plaintiffs argued in 
their filings that they were nonetheless closely controlled and supervised by 
Netflix and that, therefore, they were entitled to the basic protections of the 
FLSA.140 While these cases had the potential to be quite interesting, the Moss 
case settled on undisclosed terms, and the Akbay case was sent to 
arbitration.141  
The litigations in Otey v. CrowdFlower and those against Netflix largely 
fit into the same mode as the earlier litigations about crowdwork and 
platform workers who perform tasks in the real world. In addition to these 
computer work cases, there are other methods of accomplishing computer-
based tasks online that comprise novel forms of work that are just beginning 
to be explored. Let’s return for a moment to the CrowdFlower CEO’s 
comments about giving workers “a virtual tractor” in exchange for their time 
and labor.142 In the new forms of work discussed below, the work activity is 
often disguised as a different task, sometimes as a chore, but sometimes as a 
game or a leisure activity.143 Increasingly, as work becomes sliced up, broken 
down, and crowdsourced as part of an “open call,” it is not always apparent, 
even to the worker, what exactly their goal is by completing a task.144 In other 
instances, the participants are unclear even as to whether the activity they are 
engaging in is one requiring remuneration or that actually is considered 
 
 136 Complaint, Akbay v. Netflix, Inc., No. BC620190 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 11, 2016). 
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“work” per se.145 
A new management trend is “gamification,” with some websites using 
fun games to entice users to work for them.146 For example, one website 
presents players with puzzles, the answers to which help scientists to 
determine how proteins fold.147 Other games ask users to match themselves 
in a vocabulary game with the computer, which then “learns” from the 
responses that they give.148 In Reality is Broken, Jane McGonigal suggested 
that harnessing the power of games could help us fix problems and issues in 
the real world.149 After all, people spend billions of hours playing solitaire 
each year.150 If only a fraction of the time spent on games were spent on 
productive uses, there would be potential for solving many other types of 
problems. The introduction to this Article and the discussion of the 
reCaptcha codes note that work may be disguised. Indeed, the inventor of 
reCaptcha went on to found the company Duolingo, which helps users learn 
another language.151 At the same time, users “practice” their new language 
skills by helping to translate portions of the web, with the translation work 
generating revenue for the company.152 
Finally, our notion of work could also be changing to encompass the 
profit to be made from user-generated content, whether on social media 
websites like Facebook and Twitter,153 or whether from streams of data that 
consumers generate as they surf the web and shop online.154 While perhaps 
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not “work” per se, these concepts do involve the monetization of 
information, shopping habits, or preferences that a person holds.155 As 
marketing tools become more sophisticated, this information becomes ever 
more valuable. How should one think about these new forms of labor and 
the ways that they might be included in unjust enrichment or restitution 
theory when there is no agreement, i.e., resting at the edges of contract law? 
The rest of this Section describes some of the cases that have been 
litigated in the United States that fall into the classification of hidden work 
in cyberspace. The response to these lawsuits has been largely conclusory, 
unwelcoming to workers’ claims, and without much in the way of legal 
reasoning or theory to guide the results. U.S. courts apparently have had a 
difficult time connecting the work being performed online and the profit 
made by those who assign the tasks. Contract law offers little hope for such 
workers, in part because many of these casual work arrangements lack 
upfront agreement regarding remuneration, and the work itself is often 
hidden or disguised. Therefore, the last part of this Section seeks to examine 
U.K. law on unjust enrichment and restitution. A more developed theory of 
unjust enrichment and restitution could provide a more solid basis for 
workers’ rights in cyberspace. 
A. AOL Chat Room Moderators 
While the pace of digital work has certainly expanded in recent years, a 
lawsuit from the first internet bubble sheds some light on the genesis of many 
of these issues. In the 1990s, America Online (“AOL”) was a leading internet 
provider that provided dial-up internet access for many users. AOL also 
provided its users with “chat rooms,” areas where its users could connect on 
boards to talk about various topics like sports or movies. But with the large 
number of subscribers, AOL faced the problem of having little control over 
these chat rooms, and the concern that some of the content posted by users 
might be obscene, crude, or otherwise offensive to other users within their 
community.156 
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To remedy the issue, AOL recruited what it called “community leaders,” 
a group of volunteer members who would help administer the chat rooms 
and make sure that the subscribers felt safe.157 Community leaders also 
provided other services, including “website maintenance, technical support, 
and training and supervision” of other users.158 While these content 
moderators were not given wages, they were provided with free internet 
access.159 Given that AOL charged its subscribers based on usage, free access 
was a significant benefit to high-volume users.160 By the end of the decade, 
some estimated that there were over 10,000 content moderators who were 
monitoring and assisting AOL not only with chat rooms, but with other 
services to help fellow subscribers.161 
Toward the end of the 1990s, AOL became more corporatized and some 
of the “volunteers” began to balk at what they viewed as more onerous 
assignments and reduction of benefits that they would receive.162 Initially, 
two workers filed suit in federal district court in Manhattan, alleging that 
they were entitled to compensation for the time they spent on content 
moderation.163 In the words of their lawyer, “AOL is a for-profit business. . . . 
The minimum-wage laws require people get paid a minimum wage.”164 
According to the allegations in the complaint, AOL had treated the content 
moderators much like employees, asking those users who wanted to be 
moderators to apply for the position, agree to time commitments of at least 
three hours per week, and even to fill out timecards.165 After another suit 
alleging violations of the California minimum wage law was filed, the 
company fought back through a series of motions over jurisdiction.166 
Ultimately, though, AOL settled the case for $15 million, with one third 
of the recovery allocated to the content moderators, one-third to the 
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attorneys, and one-third dedicated as a donation to charity.167 Even though 
the case settled, it was prescient. Rather than buy into AOL’s idea that work 
online should be seen as “free” or “volunteer,” the content moderators noted 
that they were doing the same type of work that would generate remuneration 
in other contexts. Just because they were fellow users, or because they 
enjoyed what they were doing, did not mean that they were not working. 
B. Huffington Post Bloggers Lawsuit 
Another, later case pertaining to internet labor also involved AOL in its 
later iteration as a media and content provider. The Huffington Post, also 
known as either HuffPo or the “HuffPost,” is a “popular weblog that serves 
as a forum for current news events and left-leaning political commentary.”168 
The HuffPost features straightforward news reports as well as op-ed 
commentaries, which have a left-leaning ideological slant.169 Regardless of 
political affiliation, the HuffPost was able to attract sophisticated and skilled 
writers to produce posts.170 This is because professional writers and 
politicians who would normally be paid for their writing contributed their 
efforts to the Huffington Post for free.171 Most of the contributing authors 
volunteered their time on the assumption that they were adding to a political 
community and promoting progressive causes.172 Fresh and updated content 
attracted a large audience to the blog, which reached 15 million hits per 
weekday.173 
In 2011, media conglomerate AOL submitted a $315 million bid to 
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acquire the Huffington Post website.174 AOL had been searching for more 
content as well as web traffic for its sites, and so the merger made business 
sense. The owners of HuffPost, Arianna Huffington and her financial 
backers, anticipated making quite a handsome profit from the deal.175 The 
acquisition, however, failed to credit the work of the writers who had built 
the blog from the ground up; they were to receive nothing.176 One of the 
bloggers, Jonathan Tasini, a journalist and labor activist, filed a lawsuit along 
with other unpaid bloggers to challenge the deal.177 The HuffPost bloggers 
claimed that because their efforts and work had built up the value of the blog, 
they deserved a share of the profit.178 They structured their complaint to 
pursue alternate theories of contract and unjust enrichment/restitution.179 
Just like many other contract disputes, the ultimate issue with 
Huffington Post was the differing expectations that motivated the respective 
parties. Looking at the issue from the bloggers’ perspective, they wrote posts 
without payment partly for exposure, but also because most probably 
believed that they were contributing to a political website that advanced the 
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causes that they were passionate about.180 Profit wasn’t a motivating factor 
for the writers and they believed this to be true of Arianna Huffington and 
the other blog backers. After the merger was announced, the bloggers learned 
that the founders of the website were motivated by profit. It was that 
disconnect that led the bloggers to feel taken advantage of by the 
organizers.181 On the other hand, the Huffington Post claimed that the 
bloggers did receive a substantial benefit, as they used the Huffington Post 
“to connect and help their work be seen by as many people as possible . . . . 
It’s the same reason people go on TV shows: to promote their views and 
ideas.”182 
In 2012, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New 
York granted AOL’s motion to dismiss, holding that the bloggers had not 
pleaded the elements of an unjust enrichment claim.183 The bloggers 
appealed to the Second Circuit, only to have their claim rejected there as 
well.184 The court opinions cited the well-known elements for unjust 
enrichment in the state of New York: “(1) that the defendant benefitted; (2) at 
the plaintiff’s expense; and (3) that equity and good conscience require 
restitution.”185 
Both the district court and the Second Circuit found that there was no 
unjust enrichment based on the elements of the doctrine.186 They pointed to 
the fact that there was no agreement for remuneration at the outset and thus 
there was no unfairness that would justify a recovery.187 As the district court 
stated, “[T]he plaintiffs entered into their transactions with the defendants 
with full knowledge of the facts and no expectation of compensation other 
than exposure.”188 At another point in the opinion, the court noted that the 
plaintiffs “got what they paid for” and that “[n]o one forced the plaintiffs to 
 
 180 See Linkins, supra note 172. 
 181 The unpaid bloggers posted on the Twitter account #huffpuff, claiming that the 
HuffPost “built a blog-empire on the backs of thousands of citizen journalists.” Silver, supra 
note 171. 
 182 Jeremy W. Peters, Huffington Post Is Target of Suit on Behalf of Bloggers, N.Y. 
TIMES: MEDIA DECODER (Apr. 12, 2011, 12:49 PM), 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/huffington-post-is-target-of-suit-on-
behalf-of-bloggers/?pagemode=print (quoting Arianna Huffington’s spokesperson Mario 
Ruiz). 
 183 Tasini v. AOL, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 734, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 184 Tasini v. AOL, Inc., 505 Fed. App’x 45, 48 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’g 851 F. Supp. 2d 734 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 185 Tasini, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (quoting In re Mid–Island Hosp., Inc., 276 F.3d 123, 
129 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
 186 See Tasini, 505 F. App’x at 47–48; Tasini, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 741. 
 187 See Tasini, 505 F. App’x at 47; Tasini, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 740. 
 188 Tasini, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 740. 
 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [85 
give their work to The Huffington Post for publication.”189 The court then 
went on to cite many instances in which they stated that “an expectation of 
compensation” was an important and necessary component of an unjust 
enrichment or restitution claim.190 
The court in the Huffington Post case seems to have conflated the 
reasoning in a contract case (based on mutual assent and consideration) with 
recovery under an unjust enrichment or restitution theory in which the 
agreement itself may be defective or only partial. Indeed, it is hornbook law 
that an unjust enrichment or restitution plaintiff does not require traditional 
assent.191 Nor need an unjust enrichment or restitution plaintiff show that 
there was consideration or the element of exchange. Indeed, the elements of 
the test in the United States suggest that to prove unjust enrichment or 
restitution, it is enough to show that a benefit that was bestowed upon the 
other party and unfairness or injustice results.192 As society moves toward 
forms of work that are increasingly a mixture of both work and potentially 
disguised leisure activities, the rationale, such as it is in this case, is 
extremely conclusory and problematic. The following case bears some 
resemblance to the Huffington Post bloggers, involving more politically 
liberal causes, but it has yet to give rise to a lawsuit. 
C. Facebook Group: Pantsuit Nation 
In October of 2016, a “secret” Facebook group called “Pantsuit Nation” 
formed on Facebook.193 The purpose of the invitation-only group was to 
show support for Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, and the group encouraged voters to wear a pantsuit to the polls when 
voting in the national election.194 The Facebook group proved popular, 
swelling to almost four million members.195 In days leading up to the 
election, a variety of posts emerged online, some hewing to the original idea 
of wearing a pantsuit and expressing support for Clinton, but others telling 
stories about facing down sexism or longstanding activism in the Democratic 
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party.196 
After the election results were announced, “Pantsuit Nation” evolved 
into a space where members could write about their thoughts, feelings, and 
fears surrounding the outcome of the election.197 Some of the stories in 
“Pantsuit Nation” involved standing up to sexism, racism, or other 
intolerance, some were family pictures or those of LGBT couples getting 
married, and still other stories presented “feel-good” tales about random acts 
of kindness.198 Many people found support in the website as they dealt with 
feelings of disappointment and grief over the outcome of the election. Some 
speculated that the Facebook group could create a motivated base that might 
help Democratic candidates in state and local elections.199 
On December 19, 2016, Libby Chamberlain, the original creator of the 
secret Facebook group, announced that she had landed a contract to publish 
a coffee table book based on the posts within Pantsuit Nation.200 While some 
members of the group applauded the announcement and many committed to 
buying the book, thousands of critical and negative comments appeared.201 
Many people thought that they were participating in a “secret” group, which 
implied that the posts would not be shared, let alone published.202 Many 
members who commented on the post were outraged and offended at what 
they saw as the exploitation of the group’s stories and pictures for the profit 
of only one group member.203 
For a sample of the type of posts that appeared, take one op-ed from a 
member of the group that appeared a day after the decision to print a coffee-
table book was announced: 
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What had once been a space of solidarity started to feel like a 
branding machine. And now, of course, there is a book deal, 
announced with no transparency as to where the profits from the 
book are going, [and] whether the contributors whose posts 
Chamberlain is presumably selecting for this book will get paid . . . . 
Pantsuit Nation reportedly is working to become a 501(c)(3) and 
501(c)(4) charity, which raises more questions about profit 
allocation and distribution. Chamberlain is the only person credited 
on the book pre-order page, which . . . is already available for 
$17.99 on Barnes and Noble’s website.204 
In response, Chamberlain posted another explanatory message noting 
that permission would be obtained before using any story or picture from the 
group.205 Furthermore, she stated that Pantsuit Nation was filing the papers 
to be recognized as a non-profit, and that proceeds from the book would be 
used to further the goals and priorities of the group.206 However, many 
commenters were unhappy and continued to voice their objections; to the 
point where Chamberlain shut down the comments.207 Chamberlain followed 
up with members, letting them know that the book would be helping to raise 
money for Planned Parenthood, the ACLU, and the Southern Poverty Law 
Center.208 
Perhaps because Chamberlain was subject to pressure from members of 
the Facebook group (who, besides being contributors were also the intended 
audience for the book), she modified her plans for the book itself. By making 
sure to receive permission and then agreeing to donate money to charity, a 
lawsuit may have been avoided. No lawsuit had been filed as of the time of 
the writing of this Article. That said, the key difference between Pantsuit 
Nation and the unsuccessful case of the Huffington Post bloggers is the 
aspect of publicity and exposure. The court in Huffington Post seemed to 
focus on the fact that the bloggers gained notoriety through their 
contributions to the blog. The writers did not bargain for money, but they did 
expect publicity. This argument, however, would not work for Chamberlain 
or Pantsuit Nation. The authors posted in the Facebook group specifically to 
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support each other and candidate Hillary Clinton, not for profit and not for 
exposure. Moreover, Pantsuit Nation was an invitation-only, moderated, 
“secret” group—a key difference between it and the HuffPost case. 
D. Yelp Case 
A final online labor case that involves contract and unjust enrichment 
themes is Jeung v. Yelp, Inc.209 Most internet users are familiar with Yelp, 
which exists to help the crowd rate commercial businesses. Anyone who is 
a Yelp member can write a review, either lauding or railing against hotels, 
restaurants, and bars, among other services.210 Most people treat Yelp as an 
occasional pastime, and might write one or two reviews a month, while other 
users spend a great deal of time on the site writing reviews. While Yelp does 
not pay reviewers, they do acknowledge that very active contributors do 
build value for its website and app.211 In recognition of this fact, Yelp has 
encouraged its most active and well-respected reviewers to keep writing by 
awarding them “Elite” status along with perks.212 
The plaintiffs in Jeung alleged that they should be entitled to minimum 
wage for time spent writing customer reviews that they posted on Yelp.213 
Their alternative argument was that they were entitled to recover the amount 
of money that Yelp gained from the reviews under a type of unjust 
enrichment or restitution theory.214 The plaintiffs further alleged that they 
were injured when Yelp removed their status as “Elite” reviewers and that 
they were treated unfairly when their accounts were deactivated.215 
Before any substantive issues could be decided, however, the case was 
dismissed due to a lack of follow-up by the plaintiff.216 Arguably, the 
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minimum wage claims for Yelp reviews were marginal; most people do not 
expect to be compensated for offering a “man on the street” type of opinion, 
or their rants and raves about favorite restaurants or shoddy service at a bar. 
But people can volunteer their time on the internet, and offering people an 
opportunity to do so (even on a for-profit website) certainly is fine, so long 
as those who are contributing are informed about their involvement. Of 
course, that said, if someone invested a great deal of time volunteering, 
perhaps that user might have some colorable claim to continue using a 
service, and not to be summarily kicked off without notice, even if that would 
technically be allowed under a EULA. While the claims in Jeung were 
arguably weaker than those asserted in Tasini v. AOL or Rojas-Lozano v. 
Google, it would have been interesting to watch the court more fully explore 
the unjust enrichment issues. 
IV. THEORIES OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION APPLIED TO 
ONLINE AND VIRTUAL WORK 
A. Problems with Applying Existing Contract, Restitution, and Unjust 
Enrichment Law Online 
The on-demand economy is part of an ongoing digital transformation of 
work with technology as its catalyst.217 Some of these fast-paced changes are 
creating forms of work that many may not recognize, or that may be 
indistinguishable from other forms of work due to their mimicry of other 
activities, including those that people do as mundane tasks or chores, or those 
that people engage in for fun or leisure.218 At present, however, part of the 
issue is that people may not even be aware that they are “working” or that 
activities that they take part in are being monetized or commodified.219 Some 
of this commodification activity online may result in contests, disputes, and 
even legal battles.220 
Contract law is stymied in many of these online work situations because 
assent, widely acknowledged as the underpinning of contract, is generally 
absent. In many of the examples provided in Part III, there was technically 
no “contract,” if only because one party was unaware that work or monetized 
activity was being performed. Although the United States courts that have 
examined these cases have purported to use an unjust enrichment or 
restitution formulation to analyze the issues, they seem to have defaulted to 
what they know—i.e., a traditional contract analysis. For example, in Tasini 
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v. AOL, the court fell back on the question of what the Huffington Post and 
the bloggers had agreed to in the first instance.221 Because there was no 
remuneration promised up front, the court reasoned, that meant that the 
bloggers could not have expected payment for their work.222 Never mind the 
contributors’ beliefs that they were contributing to a community rather than 
a money-making endeavor. 
Of course, people may choose to volunteer their time or money, but 
many people would recognize that the decision to volunteer must be based 
on accurate information.223 That is why charity watchdogs and websites that 
monitor charitable donations exist.224 People want to know that if they are 
going to give time or money, it goes to a cause that they believe in, and not 
to extraneous activities like enrichment of the charity’s founders or to 
marketing activities. The same is true for donations of time and effort in 
cyberspace. 
Unfortunately, contract law and theory as applied in the United States 
has largely proven to be a dead-end for these unpaid “work-like” monetized 
activities on the internet. Due to the adhesion and boilerplate structures 
inherent in the EULAs, discussed earlier, the terms and conditions on many 
of these websites are far removed from “agreement” that forms the bedrock 
notion of voluntary assent inherent in contract law.225 In many instances, the 
platforms or websites claim full rights over anything that is produced on their 
website, deeming the labor that users provide to be part of a different, 
separate contract that they have no concern with, or to be volunteer work. 
The idea of agreement to these terms is a fiction; the terms are those of a 
EULA which is essentially a one-sided boilerplate. In the instances where 
platforms are used, but the tasks are performed in the real world, courts have 
expressed a willingness to look at the substance of the relationship beyond 
the EULA.226 The question is why courts are unwilling to undertake the same 
type of searching analysis when tasks are performed wholly within 
cyberspace, on an unknowing basis. 
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B. Toward a More Expansive Theoretical Account: Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment in U.K. Law 
The U.S. and U.K. law of restitution and unjust enrichment share 
common roots. Of course, the concepts and ideas behind restitution and 
unjust enrichment are ancient, tracing back to notions first expressed in 
Roman law.227 In modern times, an attempt at organization, categorization, 
and modernization of the doctrine came from the American Law Institute, 
which in 1937 published the Restatement of the Law of Restitution.228 After 
this innovation, however, the field of restitution for the most part languished 
in the United States.229 As Professor John Langbein has noted, it was “as 
though a neutron bomb has hit the field – the monuments have been left 
standing, but the people have been killed off. . . . What restitution is taught 
in American law schools today turns up mostly in snippits in the remedy 
units of contracts and trust books . . . .”230 As Professor Douglas Laycock has 
noted, over the years the subject of restitution standing on its own has largely 
been dropped from the law school curricula in the United States.231 
Luckily for our purposes, a great deal more theoretical development of 
the doctrine has occurred within the law of the United Kingdom, where in 
1966 an expansive, influential, and canonical discussion of the subject 
appeared in Robert Goff and Gareth Jones’s The Law on Restitution.232 In 
U.K. law,233 restitution is seen as its own doctrinal area, containing a number 
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of theories, including that of unjust enrichment.234 As one leading 
commentator has put it, restitution is “the area of law concerned with 
relieving a defendant of wealth which, in the eyes of the law, he should not 
be entitled to retain.”235 Restitution may also refer to the remedial measure 
that may be available to a plaintiff who has been wronged through an unjust 
enrichment. As defined by another commentator, “where a wrong has been 
committed the victim of the wrong may be able to bring a restitutionary claim 
to recover the value of the benefit obtained by the defendant as a result of 
the wrongdoing.”236 
Commentators and law professors including Peter Birks, Andrew 
Tettenborn, and Graham Virgo, among many others, have published rich 
theoretical accounts that explore the constituent components of when an 
obligation should be recognized or a civil remedy should be awarded. As 
Professor Tettenborn has noted: 
Why should the law of tort, which is normally concerned with loss, 
allow recovery of benefits gained instead? Why should a term 
requiring payment for part performance be implied in a contract? 
What justifies giving a remedy to a mistaken payer who has 
divested himself of ownership of the sum paid? It is suggested that 
if we can find a common explanation for recovery here we should; 
and further that, subject to certain variations, that explanation is the 
broad principle of unjust enrichment.237 
To a foreign reader, these accounts all seem to be searching for an underlying 
unifying concept or philosophy behind the award of remedies. English cases 
have recognized the existence of unjust enrichment and restitution theories. 
As noted by Professor Gerhard Dannemann, “Preceded and helped by 
scholarly work, English courts have unfrozen the law of restitution and 
have . . . achieved a rapid development which might have taken a century in 
other areas of law.”238 
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In recent work, Professor Andrew Burrows has published both a treatise 
entitled The Law of Restitution239 and a Restatement of the English Law of 
Unjust Enrichment.240 The account of unjust enrichment and restitution law 
that follows draws on the work of Burrows and the canonical treatise by Goff 
and Jones. The following is a summary and encapsulation of the most 
important elements of English unjust enrichment law. The next Section 
applies these elements to online labor claims. 
Professor Burrows distills the elements of an unjust enrichment and 
restitution claim by asking a series of questions: “(1) has the defendant been 
benefited (i.e. enriched)? (2) was the enrichment at the claimant’s expense? 
(3) was the enrichment unjust? (4) are there any defences?”241 These 
questions are found throughout the scholarly commentary with only a few 
slight and token deviations in the phrasing of the questions.242 As Burrows 
goes on to explain, the bulk of the law coalesces around the concepts of 
“benefit,” the idea of “the claimant’s expense,” “unjust factors,” and 
“defences.”243 The rest of Burrows’ treatise expands upon each of these 
questions and issues in turn, providing discussion of theoretical problems as 
well as sample cases along the way. 
Under the first question of benefit and enrichment, Burrows notes 
several issues. The straightforward case would be one in which a claimant 
seeks property that has been retained by the defendant.244 Such a case is easy 
in that the defendant can hardly refuse to give up the property by claiming 
that it is of no value.245 In some instances, however, issues may be raised 
around benefit, especially with performances, because of the subjectivity of 
value and the fact that benefits may be either positive or negative.246 Further 
refinements center around so-called incontrovertible benefits, which are so 
obviously beneficial that “no reasonable man could seriously deny that he 
has been benefited.”247 
The second question focuses on whether there is a connection between 
the claimant and the enrichment that he or she desires to claim. As Burrows 
notes, this question breaks down into two categories. These depend on 
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whether there has been “subtraction,” i.e., that the “defendant’s gain has 
come from the claimant’s wealth.”248 This type of unjust enrichment, also 
known as autonomous unjust enrichment, does not require any type of 
wrongdoing on the part of the defendant.249 If, on the other hand, the 
defendant’s claim came as a result of wrongdoing against the claimant, it 
would be referred to as dependent unjust enrichment.250 In the latter instance, 
because of the presence of wrongdoing, there might be other remedies 
available in addition to or perhaps apart from restitution.251 Further nuances 
and complications arise if benefits are conferred by third parties.252 
Exceptions exist for these instances, incorporating the doctrines of tracing, 
subrogation, and other concepts for third parties.253 
The third question, which is potentially the most complicated portion of 
the analysis, yet perhaps the most crucial, focuses on whether the enrichment 
is, indeed, unjust. As noted by Burrows, there is a list of “unjust factors” that 
are “regarded as the grounds for restitution roughly analogous to the different 
torts in the law of tort.”254 The unjust factors are classified based on whether 
they flow from autonomous unjust enrichment or dependent unjust 
enrichment, with the distinguishing feature being the defendant’s 
wrongdoing.255 The grounds for restitution independent of the defendant’s 
wrong may include “mistake, ignorance, duress, undue influence, 
exploitation of weakness, legal compulsion, necessity, failure of 
consideration, illegality, incapacity . . .” among others, a list that may be 
added to based on the needs of justice.256 In terms of instances where there 
is a restitution based on wrongs of the defendant, this may refer to torts, 
breach of contract, or breach of fiduciary duty, but again, this list may change 
based on the facts and nuances of the cases.257 Other commentators have 
analyzed this particular element differently,258 but the majority approach 
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seems focused on having the claimant prove an unjust factor. As Goff and 
Jones note, however, the categories of unjust enrichment are still open and 
“courts have the power to recognize new grounds of recovery.”259 
Finally, there is the fourth question of whether there are any defenses. 
Burrows notes eight such defenses, which focus on whether the defendant 
continues to be enriched, and to extinguishing the claimant’s assertion that 
the enrichment was unjust.260 The defenses include “change of position, 
estoppel, counter-restitution, limitation, ‘dispute resolved’, incapacity, 
illegality, and bona fide purchase.”261 Birks, on the other hand, characterizes 
defenses as instances in which the unjust enrichment claimant will himself 
be unjustly enriched, when the claim breaks the rules of finality of litigation, 
and when it would stultify or make nonsensical the articulated law in other 
areas.262 
The summary provides only the barest of broad-brush sketches of an 
important area of U.K. law, one in which there are many learned treatises. 
Although the United States has recently seen a resurgence of interest in the 
study of unjust enrichment and restitution, along with the articulation of the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment in 2011, these 
theories are not generally taught in law school classes and many practicing 
lawyers and judges are wholly unaware of them.263 Nonetheless, in light of 
new types of labor and unpaid work on the internet, some of the more 
complex nuances of unjust enrichment and restitution under U.K. law may 
provide the intellectual tools necessary to process and resolve any such 
claim. 
C. Application of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Principles to  
Online Work Situations 
The unjust enrichment and restitution frameworks present in U.K. law 
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are much more complete and fleshed out than their rather neglected 
analogues set out in American jurisprudence. Would a more complete and 
well-thought-out set of doctrinal tools make a difference in terms of 
resolving issues of what amounts to misrepresented, unpaid, or otherwise 
disguised labor online? As noted by J. Beatson, restitution is “an independent 
category of obligations . . . used to give new perspectives and new solutions 
to old problems . . . to fill gaps left in other categories. Restitution is therefore 
an interesting alternative to traditional remedies in contract and tort.”264 One 
of the long-existing struggles in industrial relations is the issue of fair and 
proper compensation to workers when there is a gap between the fruits of 
worker’s labor and the returns that accrue to them. Are these employment 
concerns actually contract, property, or tort law problems? The answer is that 
they may not be categorized neatly, and because they do not exactly “fit” one 
of the traditional categories, these issues go unnoticed and uncompensated. 
Perhaps unjust enrichment and restitution provide a better framework for 
answering some of these questions especially within the vast structural 
changes that are currently happening to the employment relationship. 
To analyze the problem of online work, it is helpful to return to the 
questions that Burrows asks: “(1) has the defendant been benefited (i.e. 
enriched)? (2) was the enrichment at the claimant’s expense? (3) was the 
enrichment unjust? (4) are there any defences?”265 To turn to the first 
question, in all of the online labor disputes, the website operators were 
definitely enriched, as they received the value, in the aggregate, of free labor. 
That labor might have been disguised as something else, as in the reCaptcha 
case, but it was still work. In other situations, the work might have been 
masquerading as leisure, but the defendant was still benefited by the value 
of the website users’ time. How much this might be worth could be an open 
question, but thousands of hours of time completing computer tasks or 
writing articles for free are certainly of great value and many businesses 
would love to have that benefit. 
The second question asks whether there is a relationship between the 
claimant and the enrichment. There certainly seems to be a link as noted in 
the discussion of the facts. Autonomous unjust enrichment does not require 
that there be any wrongdoing by the defendant; but there could be if 
disguised work is a kind of omission or misrepresentation. The third question 
then asks whether there is a “basis” for finding the enrichment to be an unjust 
one. This really does seem to get at the crux of the matter. Just because there 
has been enrichment does not mean that it is legally problematic. Therefore, 
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there is an extensive list of reasons that provide just such a basis for unjust 
enrichment. From this list, those that seem to be most applicable to the 
situation of online work that is at issue here in this Article include mistake 
and ignorance. Finally, with regard to question four, there do not seem to be 
any applicable defenses. 
Keep in mind that the U.K. treatises on restitution and unjust enrichment 
were formulated in a time before such online work structures existed, and 
before the “sharing economy,” “gamification,” or digital work had any 
attention whatsoever. There do not appear to be any decided cases in this 
area in the United Kingdom; a complete analysis must therefore be left to the 
future and the elaboration of U.K. judges and legal scholars. 
At present, the U.S. decisions about payment for online labor ultimately 
seem to revert to notions of contract, based on free and voluntary agreement 
and assent. While courts say that they are engaging in an unjust enrichment 
analysis (for that is how the claims are brought and styled), courts instead 
reflexively default to issues like a priori remuneration or whether the parties 
had assented. These assumptions about unjust enrichment and restitution 
seem to give short shrift to what those causes of action stand for, and why 
they exist—i.e., that they are formulated to address injustices even when 
there is no contract and there is no assent. At present, many of these types of 
cases are being litigated in the United States; yet, because judges seem to be 
unfamiliar with restitution and unjust enrichment concepts, they fail to draw 
on this body of law that would be highly applicable. The United Kingdom 
has a great deal of applicable law on the books, but no cases that pertain to 
disguised online labor as of yet. 
CONCLUSION 
Technology and the rise of the sharing economy have given us new and 
diverse structures for how businesses operate and how work is conducted. 
As noted in the first part of this Article, courts are beginning to examine 
more closely the central question of whether workers are independent 
contractors or employees, regardless of the label affixed to the relationship 
in a EULA on a website. In the absence of a definitive answer to the 
characterization question through contract law, courts will analyze the 
substance of the relationship using factors that attempt to determine a right 
of control over an employee or by looking at indicia of entrepreneurial 
activities test, to see if indeed the worker is engaged in a wholly separate 
business. 
Other forms of online work create even more difficult problems than 
classification. As described above, in some instances, work is disguised as 
an innocuous task, such as entering a code or answering a question. In other 
instances, work could be hidden as a leisure activity, such as in gamification. 
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Still other disputes involve internet users making contributions to online 
activities, believing that they are contributing to an online community or 
non-profit. 
To date, plaintiffs in these new online work cases in the United States 
have had their cases dismissed in part because they have yet to find a solid 
doctrinal ground for recovery. Contract law is stymied in many of these 
online work situations because assent—widely acknowledged as 
foundational to contract—is generally absent. Assent is lacking because, in 
these situations, one party was unaware that work was being performed, or 
that their work might later be monetized. Even though the United States 
courts that have examined these cases have purported to use an unjust 
enrichment or restitution formulation to analyze the issues, in reality they are 
defaulting to traditional notions of agreement or assent that are grounded in 
contract law. Referring to the more richly nuanced and developed law of 
unjust enrichment and restitution in U.K. law may result in a more fruitful 
and well-reasoned analysis of these cases. 
 
